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"NOT AS A STRANGER": NON-EMPLOYEE UNION
ORGANIZERS SOLICITING ON COMPANY PROPERTY*
SECTION 7 of the National Labor Relations Act guarantees employees the
right of self-organization.' Employees may exercise this right by engaging in
organizing activities on company property.2 However, the employer may re-
strict the exercise of this right in order to prevent interference with efficient
plant production and discipline 3 as long as no discrimination occurs.4 Thus,
the employer may always prohibit union organizing by employees during work-
ing hours,5 but during nonworking hours employees may be barred from
soliciting only where special circumstances indicate actual or potential inter-
ference with plant operation.6 Where the organizers seeking to solicit on com-
pany property are non-employees, the extent to which section 7 protects their
*NLRB v. Seamprufe, Inc., 222 F.2d 858 (10th Cir. 1955), denying enforcement to 109
N.L.R.B. 24 (1954), cert. granted, 350 U.S. 818 (1955) ; NLRB v. Babcock and Wilcox
Co., 222 F2d 316 (5th Cir. 1955), denying enforcement to 109 N.L.R.B. 485 (1954),
cert. granted, 350 U.S. 818 (1955) ; NLRB v. Monsanto Chemical Co., 225 F.2d 16 (9th
Cir. 1955), denying enforcenrent to 108 N.L.R.B. 1110 (1954), petition for cert. filed,
24 U.S.L. WEEK 3123 (U.S. Nov. 1, 1955) (No. 492).
1. Section 7 provides that "employees shall have the right to self-organization, to
form, join, or assist labor organizations, to bargain collectively through representatives
of their own choosing.. . ." 49 STAT. 452 (1935), as amended, 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1952).
Under § 8(1) it is an unfair labor practice for an employer to "interfere with, restrain,
or coerce employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed in section 7." 49 STAT. 452
(1935), as amended, 29 U.S.C. § 158(a) (1) (1952). The Taft-Hlartley amendments left
the quoted portions of these sections unchanged. The purpose of the statute is to foster
self-organization and collective bargaining as a solvent to industrial ills. 49 STAT. 449
(1935), as amended, 29 U.S.C. § 151 (1952); NLRB v. Cities Service Oil Co., 122 F.2d
149, 152 (2d Cir. 1941).
2. Republic Aviation Corp. v. NLRB, 324 U.S. 793 (1945). Prior to the enactment
of the statute the employer had full authority to regulate conduct on his property by
virtue of property and contract principles. See Daykin, Emiployees" Right to Organize
on Company Time and Company Property, 42 IL L. REv. 301 (1947).
3. Republic Aviation Corp. v. NLRB, supra note 2, at 797-98; Peyton Packing Co., 49
N.L.R.B. 828, 843 (1943), enforcement granted, 142 F.2d 1009 (5th Cir. 1944), cert. denied,
323 U.S. 730 (1945). In general, an employer may enforce such rules as the proper
conduct of his business requires. NLRB v. Mylan-Sparta Co., 166 F.2d 485 (6th Cir.
1948); NLRB v. Hudson Motor Car Co., 128 F.2d 528 (6th Cir. 1942).
4. It is an unfair labor practice for the employer to prohibit union activities while
allowing anti-union activities, NLRB v. Harbison-Walker Refractories Co., 135 F.2d 837
(8th Cir. 1943); NLRB v. William Davies Co., 135 F.2d 179, 181 (7th Cir. 1943), com-
mercial solicitation, United Aircraft Corp., 67 N.L.R.B. 594 (1946), or even charitable
solicitation, Standard-Coosa-Thatcher Co., 85 N.L.R.B. 1358, 1365 (1949).
5. E.g., NLRB v. Edinburg Citrus Ass'n, 147 F.2d 353 (5th Cir. 1945); accord,
Peyton Packing Co., 49 N.L.R.B. 828, 843 (1943), enforcement granted, 142 F.2d 1009
(5th Cir. 1944), cert. denied, 323 U.S. 730 (1945).
6. E.g., NLRB v. La Salle Steel Co., 178 F.2d 829 (7th bir. 1949), cert. denied, 339
US. 963 (1950). Paid lunch periods are considered employees' own time. Olin Industries
v. NLRB, 191 F.2d 613 (5th Cir. 1951). Where union activity may interfere with customer
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activities is in doubt. In general, the employer's ability to exclude them has
been held to depend not only on whether interference with plant operation will
result, but also on whether the opportunity exists for solicitation off company
premises. 7 If no opportunity exists, because the nature of the employer's busi-
ness requires employees to work and live in an isolated place like a lumber camp,
non-employees may solicit on the premises.8 But absent such extreme circum-
stances, it is not clear what sort of opportunity for off-premises solicitation
will justify the employer in prohibiting access to his property.'
In three cases recently decided by circuit courts of appeals, NLRB v. Seam-
prufe, Inc.,' ° NLRB v. Babcock and Wilcox Co.," and NLRB v. Monsanto
Chemical Co.,' 2 non-employee organizers were denied access to company prop-
erty under substantially identical circumstances. In each case the organizers
had sought to distribute literature on company parking lots during nonworking
hours. 13 Traffic conditions made distribution at the plant entrance hazardous, 4
and there was no opportunity for distribution at any point between the plant
entrance and the nearby town in which most of the employees lived.15 Under
these circumstances the NLRB had found that effective solicitation could not be
relations, as on the selling floors of department stores, solicitation may be prohibited
at all times. NLRB v. May Dep't Stores Co., 154 F.2d 533 (8th Cir. 1946). See also
note 41 infra.
7. E.g., Ranco, Inc., 109 N.L.R.B. 998, 1000 (1954), enforcement granted, 222 F.2d
543 (6th Cir.), cert. granted, 350 U.S. 894 (1955). The Supreme Court has rejected
the argument that employees' ability to solicit on company property depends upon a
showing of inadequate opportunity off the premises. Republic Aviation Corp. v. NLRB,
324 U.S. 793, 798 (1945). Some courts apparently regard the Republic "no-interference"
test as applicable to both employees and non-employees. Bonwit Teller, Inc. v. NLRB,
197 F.2d 640, 645 (2d Cir. 1952) (dictum), cert. denied, 345 U.S. 905 (1953) ; Maryland
Drydock Co. v. NLRB, 183 F.2d 538, 542 (4th Cir. 1950) (dictum).
8. E.g., NLRB v. Lake Superior Lumber Corp., 167 F.2d 147 (6th Cir. 1948) ; Weyer-
hauser Timber Co., 31 N.L.R.B. 258 (1941) ; W. T. Carter and Brother, 90 N.L.R.B. 2020
(1950) (company town) ; cf. NLRB v. Cities Service Oil Co., 122 F.2d 149 (2d Cir. 1941)
(union representatives permitted aboard ship to investigate seamen's grievances).
9. Adequate opportunity for solicitation off company property has been found where
organizers can effectively solicit at or near the plant entrances off company property.
E.g., Associated Dry Goods Corp., 103 N.L.R.B. 271, 272 (1953) ; Mooresville Mills, 99
N.L.R.B. 572 (1952); Newport News Children's Dress Co., 91 N.L.R.B. 1521 (1950);
see NLRB v. Carolina Mills, Inc., 190 F.2d 675 (4th Cir. 1951), enforcing 92 N.L.R.B.
1141, 1142, 1166 (1951).
10. 222 F.2d 858 (10th Cir. 1955), denying enforcement to 109 N.L.R.B. 24 (1954),
cert. granted, 350 U.S. 818 (1955).
11. 222 F.2d 316 (5th Cir. 1955), denying enforcement to 109 N.L.R.B. 485 (1954),
cert. granted, 350 U.S. 818 (1955).
12. 225 F.2d 16 (9th Cir. 1955), denying enforcement to 108 N.L.R.B. 1110 (1954),
petition for cert. filed, 24 U.S.L. WEEY 3123 (U.S. Nov. 1, 1955) (No. 492).
13. Seamprufe, Inc., 109 N.L.R.B. 24, 29-31 (1954); Babcock and Wilcox Co., 109
N.L.R.B. 485, 492 (1954) ; Monsanto Chemical Co., 108 N.L.R.B. 1110, 1118 (1954).
14. Seamprufe, Inc., supra note 13, at 29-31; Babcock and Wilcox Co., supra note 13,
at 490, 492; Monsanto Chemical Co., supra note 13, at 1117-18.
15. Seamprufe, Inc., 109 N.L.R.B. 24, 29 (1954) ; Babcock and Wilcox Co., 109 N.L.R.B.
485, 491-92 (1954) ; Monsanto Chemical Co., 108 N.L.R.B. 1110, 1118-19 (1954).
(Vol. 65
NOTES
accomplished off company property and had ordered the company to admit
union representatives. 16
On appeal none of the courts found that solicitation off company property
was sufficiently impeded to justify the Board's order.' 7 They reasoned that
union organizers had adequate opportunity to solicit employees in town after
working hours.'- Although all recognized that organizers may be granted
access to an isolated site where employees both work and live,19 the decisions
do not indicate what other circumstances would make opportunity for solicita-
tion inadequate. Two of the courts merely declared that inadequate opportunity
exists when there is an "impediment to union solicitation off company property
amounting to a deprivation of the right of self-organization" and that absent
such a showing the solicitors are "strangers to the right of self-organization.
20
The courts' use of a "no-impediment" standard for measuring the adequacy of
opportunity for solicitation off company property derives from an unwarranted
interpretation of precedent. Early decisions had established that non-employees
could solicit on company property where there had been discriminatory denial
of the use of that property 21 or where physical limitations of employment iso-
16. Seamprufe, Inc., supra note 15, at 25, 31; Babcock and Wilcox Co., supra note
15, at 486, 493-94; Monsanto Chemical Co., supra note 15, at 1110, 1122.
17. NLRB v. Seamprufe, Inc., 222 F.2d 858, 861 (10th Cir. 1955) ; NLRB v. Babcock
and Wilcox Co., 222 F.2d 316, 319 (5th Cir. 1955); NLRB v. Monsanto Chemical Co.,
225 F.2d 16, 20-21 (9th Cir. 1955).
18. See note 17 supra. The Fifth Circuit, quoting Justice Reed's dissent in NLRB v.
Stowe Spinning Co., 336 U.S. 226, 236 (1949), intimates that once the union has won
over one employee, it must look to him to carry on solicitation at the plant. NLRB v.
Babcock and Wilcox Co., supra note 17, at 319.
19. NLRB v. Seamprufe, Inc., 222 F.2d 853, 860-61 (10th Cir. 1955) ; NLRB v. Bab-
cock and Wilcox Co., 222 F.2d 316, 318 (5th Cir. 1955) ; NLRB v. Monsanto Chemical
Co., 225 F.2d 16, 19, 21 (9th Cir. 1955).
20. NLRB v. Seamprufe, Inc., supra note 19, at 861; NLRB v. Monsanto Chemical
Co., supra note 19, at 21. These courts have also verbalized the standard as a "showing
of non-accessibility amounting to a handicap to self-organization." NLRB v. Seamprufe,
Inc., supra at 861; NLRB v. Monsanto Chemical Co., supra at 18-19.
21. NLRB v. Stowe Spinning Co., 336 U.S. 226 (1949) (non-employees granted
access to meeting hall in company town used by other organizations for community pur-
poses). Discrimination arises most frequently when no-solicitation rules are applied to
favor one union only. E.g., International Ass'n of Machinists, AFL v. NLRB, 311 U.S.
72 (1940) ; NLRB v. Waterman Steamship Corp., 309 U.S. 206 (1940) ; Samuel Bingham's
Son Mfg. Co., 80 N.L.R.B. 1612 (1948). A special problem arises when the employer
delivers a noncoercive speech to employees during hours when solicitation is prohibited.
Where the employer's no-solicitation rule applies to both working and nonworking
hours, his speech is considered a discriminatory application of the no-solicitation rule, and
he must afford a similar opportunity to the union. Bonwit Teller, Inc. v. NLRB, 197
F.2d 640 (2d Cir. 1952), cert. denied, 345 U.S. 905 (1953); NLRB v. American Tube
Bending Co., 205 F.2d 45 (2d Cir. 1953). The Board has more recently held that when
the employer does not enforce a no-solicitation rule during nonworking hours, it is not
an unfair labor practice for him to make a speech during working hours and refuse a
union request for the same opportunity. Livingston Shirt Corp., 107 N.L.R.B. 400 (1953).
The Sixth Circuit has rejected the Bonwit Teller doctrine and has ruled that it is not
an unfair labor practice for an employer with a broad no-solicitation rule (department
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lated employees from outside contacts.2 2  On the basis of these decisions
the Seventh Circuit, in Marshall Field & Co. v. NLRB,23 had verbalized a gen-
eral rule that discrimination and unique handicap were the exclusive criteria for
non-employee access to company property under section 7.24 But the Seventh
Circuit's application of its newly-discovered rule left its meaning in some doubt.
For instead of examining the difficulties of soliciting off company property to see
if an "impediment" to self-organization existed, the court analyzed the oppor-
tunity for solicitation on company property and found it already adequate.2 5
In the instant cases, however, there was a complete absence of opportunity
for solicitation at or even near the plant.26 Overlooking this factual distinction,
these circuit courts relied on Marshall Field to deny access to non-employees 27
where the opportunity for solicitation was limited almost exclusively to home
canvassing. In contrast to Marshall Field, these courts inspect the opportunity
off company property and determine that it is not so restricted as to constitute
an impediment to self-organization. This determination is at best questionable,
as contrary findings by the Fourth and Sixth Circuits on similar facts indicate.2 8
But whether or not the "no-impediment" standard was correctly applied, the
fact remains that the instant cases fail to indicate why it should be used at all.
Following the language of Marshall Field, these courts have simply assumed
that the lumber camp case established an ultimate standard and that as long
as non-employees have any opportunity for solicitation, however limited, em-
ployees' rights of self-organization are satisfied.29
Whatever privilege is to be accorded non-employee organizers to solicit on
company property arises from employees' rights of self-organization guaran-
teed by section 7. Since neither the terms of the statute nor its legislative
history indicate the role of outside organizers under section 7,30 the scope of
store) to address the employees on working time. NLRB v. F. W. Woolworth Co., 214
F.2d 78 (6th Cir. 1954). See Note, 61 YALE L.J. 1066 (1952).
22. See cases cited note 8 supra.
23. 200 F.2d 375 (7th Cir. 1952).
24. Id. at 379.
25. The employer allowed non-employee organizers to solicit in the public cafeterias
and at the store entrances. Id. at 382. Approximately 2,000 of the company's employees
had been organized by other unions in this manner. Id. at 379 n.8. The court also granted
non-employees access to a private company road bisecting the department store, which it
likened to a public street. Id. at 380.
26. See text at notes 14-16 supra.
27. NLRB v. Seamprufe, Inc., 222 F.2d 858, 860 (10th Cir. 1955) ; NLRB v. Babcock
and Wilcox Co., 222 F.2d 316, 318 (5th Cir. 1955); NLRB v. Monsanto Chemical Co.,
225 F.2d 16, 20 (9th Cir. 1955).
28. NLRB v. Caldwell Furniture Co., 199 F.2d 267 (4th Cir.), enforcing 97 N.L.R.B.
1501, 1505-06 (1952), cert. denied, 345 U.S. 907 (1953) ; NLRB v. Ranco, Inc., 222 F.2d
543 (6th Cir. 1955), enforcing 109 N.L.R.B. 998, 1003-04 (1954), cert. granted, 350 U.S.
818 (1955). The decisions do not make clear whether the courts are applying the "no-
interference" test of Republic or the "no-impediment" standard. Accord, NLRB v. Mon-
arch Tool Co., 210 F.2d 183 (6th Cir. 1954). See note 7 supra.
29. See text at note 20 supra.
30. Efforts to amend the original act to curb the activities of labor unions were rcsisted
on the ground that labor unions had a legitimate interest in employee organization. H R.
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the statute must be determined against the factual background of modern
industrial relations. In a complex industrial society employees cannot effec-
tively exercise the right of self-organization without access to outside counsel,
information and other aid. 31 Employees lack both the experience and the organ-
izational machinery requisite to successful organizing. 3 2 Moreover, individual
employees are naturally reluctant to take the initiative in action which may
place them in disfavor with their employer.33 Thus, practical considerations
dictate that the right of self-organization include the right to have outside
organizers carry out solicitation activities.
Employees' right to outside aid is valueless, however, unless it includes the
right to utilize that assistance at the place of work. The Supreme Court has
recognized the plant as the place "uniquely appropriate" for organizational
activities by employees. 3 ' It is the most effective location for communication
of information and opinion concerning labor organizations. 35 Union meetings
to organize employees after work 36 or comprehensive individual solicitation off
the premises are unsatisfactory substitutes.37 Section 7 should therefore be
REP. No. 1147, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. 16 (1935); 79 CONG. REc. 7653-58, 7660-61, 7668-70
(1935).
31. See Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516, 534 (1945) ; NLRB v. F. W. Woolworth
Co., 214 F.2d 78 (6th Cir. 1954) (dissenting opinion) ; Harlan Fuel Co., 8 N.L.R.B. 25,
32 (1938).
32. Employees must draw on outsiders with specialized skills. See DAUGHERTY, LABOR
PROBLEMS IN AMsERICAN INDUSTRY 421-22 (5th ed. 1941); Hearings Before the Committee
on Education and Labor of the Senate to Create a National Labor Board, 73d Cong., 2d
Sess., pt. 1, at 208 (1934) ; cf. NLRB v. Fansteel Metallurgical Corp., 306 U.S. 240, 248,
251 (1939) (unfair labor practice for an employer to refuse to meet with an employee
committee because it was accompanied by an outside organizer).
33. Hearings Before the Committee on Education and Labor of the Senate to Create
a National Labor Board, 73d Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 1, at 208 (1934). Senator Paul H. Douglas,
then a professor of economics, testified that the employee's job and future are so dependent
on the good will of the employer that he cannot act with the independence of an outsider.
Ibid. Field studies indicate a deep-rooted feeling among workers that their future welfare
depends upon "not crossing the boss." Note, 14 U. CH. L. REv. 104, 108 (1946). See also
GARDNER & 'MOORE, HUMAN RELATIONS IN INDUSTRY 3341 (rev. ed. 1950).
34. Republic Aviation Corp. v. NLRB, 324 U.S. 793, 801 n.6 (1945).
35. Bonwit Teller, Inc. v. NLRB, 197 F.2d 640, 645 (2d Cir. 1952), cert. denied, 345
U.S. 905 (1953); see Tomlinson of High Point, Inc., 58 N.L.R.B. 982 (1944); LINCOLN,
THE CITY OF THE DINNER-PAIL 131 (1909) ; THOMAS, AUTOMOBILE UN"IONisM 11 (1941).
36. Organization through public meetings, particularly in smaller communities like
those in which the instant cases arose, suffers from employee fear of incurring employer
disfavor and risking discharge. See dissenting opinion of Board Member Murdock in
Livingston Shirt Corp., 107 N.L.R.B. 400, 410 (1953). One union advises organizers
to avoid methods requiring workers to identify themselves openly with the union. INTER-
NATIONAL LADIES' GARMENT WORKERS' UNION, HANDBOOK OF TRADE UNION METHODS
11 (1937). Nor is it likely that workers will sacrifice their after-work hours to attend
union meetings. Kopald, Democracy and Leadership, in BAKiKE & KERR, UNIONS, MAN-
AGEMENT, AND THE PUBLIC 180 (1948). Transportation problems also handicap the effective-
ness of public meetings. See Livingston Shirt Corp., supra.
37. Home solicitation is burdened by the unavailability of home addresses, turnover
in work force and factors of transportation, time and cost. See Livingston Shirt Corp.,
1956]
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interpreted as requiring the employer to admit outsiders where their purpose
is to promote organization.
Such an interpretation would not diminish the employer's ability to protect
plant production and discipline from interference. Opportunity of non-em-
ployees to organize on company property would never exceed employees'
privileges, which must always stop short of interference with plant efficiencyYa
The Board has always allowed the employer to impose reasonable regulations
on the union's access to and use of his property, requiring only that the rules
bear some relation to the maintenance of efficiency and discipline.39 Rules
denying non-employees access to functional parts of the plant fall into this
category.40 Under certain circumstances the employer is warranted in pro-
hibiting solicitation altogether upon his premises. For example, a context of
disorder or labor violence would constitute circumstances justifying the impo-
sition of rules that would otherwise be invalid. 4 1
supra note 36, at 422 (dissenting opinion). For the problems of organizers in effecting
home solicitation, see BRooKs, WHEN LABOR ORGANIZES 2 (1937); BARIBASH, LABOR
UNIoNs IN AcTION 26 (1948). Home solicitation is most effective at the start of a campaign
to convince a few key workers rather than as an instrument of mass communication. See
Note, 61 YALE L.J. 1066, 1075 n.35 (1952).
38. See note 3 supra. Restrictions on solicitation during working hours may be made
applicable equally to employees and non-employees. E.g., NLRB v. Montgomery Ward
& Co., 157 F.2d 486, 493-94 (8th Cir. 1946); McKinney Lumber Co., 82 N.L.R.B. 3S,
43 (1949).
39. NLRB orders granting access to non-employee organizers specifically provide for
reasonable regulation of that access. See, e.g., Seamprufe, Inc., 109 N.L.R.B. 24, 25
(1954) ; NLRB v. Lake Superior Lumber Corp., 167 F.2d 147, 150 (6th Cir. 1948). The
employer may require organizers to register at the gate. Motor Freight, Inc., 57 N.L.R.B.
1340 (1944).
Disruption of operating efficiency will enable the employer to curb otherwise permissible
activities. Monarch Co., 56 N.L.R.B. 1749, 1752 (1949) ; National Screw & Mfg. Co., 51
N.L.R.B. 583, 586, 589 (1943). But the employer must bear the burden of showing a
correlation between declining production and solicitation. Union Mfg. Co., 63 N.L.R.B.
254 & n.2 (1945).
Restrictions become unreasonable when extrinsic evidence shows that the primary purpose
is to curb organization. Kohen-Ligon-Folz, Inc., 36 N.L.R.B. 1294, 1299-1303, enforced,
128 F.2d 502, 503 (5th Cir. 1942) ; Odenbach Shipbuilding Corp., 64 N.L.R.B. 1026 (1945).
40. E.g., Colonial Shirt Corp., 96 N.L.R.B. 711 (1951) ; Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 91
N.L.R.B. 955 (1950); Tabin-Picker & Co., 50 N.L.R.B. 928 (1943). If the employer
affords adequate opportunity for solicitation he may restrict the right to distribute literature
to particular areas. E.g., Monolith Portland Cement Co., 94 N.L.R.B. 1358 (1951) ; BroN n
Shipbuilding Co., 66 N.L.R.B. 1047 (1946); Goodyear Aircraft Corp., 57 N.L.R.B. 502
(1944).
41. E.g., Boeing Airplane Co. v. NLRB, 217 F.2d 369 (9th Cir. 1954) (tense atmos-
phere following termination of strike) ; Johnson-Stephens & Shinkle Shoe Co., 54 N.L.R.B.
189, 192 (1943) (violence); Nash-Kelvinator Corp., 18 N.L.R.B. 738, 741-44 (1939)
(forcible eviction of inspectors); see NLRB v. Aintree Corp., 135 F.2d 395, 397 (7th
Cir. 1943) (rival union literature taunted so-called company union) ; cf. Maryland Dry-
dock Co. v. NLRB, 183 F.2d 538 (4th Cir. 1950) (employer may properly forbid distri-
bution of union literature of a defamatory nature).
Mere probability of violence may constitute special circumstances justifying restriction,
but the burden rests on the employer to show that the probability exists. Kimble Glass
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Section 7 does not grant outside organizers a right to solicit on company
property independent of employees' right of self-organization. The courts in
the instant cases properly declare that some relationship should exist between
the organizers and the employees.42 But it would be grossly unfair to demand
that the union be the employees' bargaining agent or that some employee belong
to the union as the court in Seamprufe suggests.43 Babcock would apparently
require some evidence that organizers are working in concert with or have been
solicited by the employees. 44 Even this seems unjustified since requiring any
one employee or group of employees to express their interest in having outside
organizers come in would unfairly distinguish them from their fellow workers
and expose them to reprisals. It would seem proper to infer the requisite re-
lationship from all the circumstances, with the aid, if necessary, of a presump-
tion of interest by employees absent an affirmative showing to the contrary.
Under this approach it is reasonable to conclude that a sufficient employee-
organizer relationship existed in the instant cases. 45
For future cases, however, requirement of proof of an employee-organizer
relationship may precipitate unfair results. Any efforts by an employer to
demonstrate employee lack of interest in outside organization will inevitably
tend to inhibit free expression by some employees. This potential barrier to
employee organization could be avoided by not requiring that the relationship
exist between organizers and employees of the particular plant. It can be argued
that section 7 guarantees to employees the right to induce workers at other
plants to join their union in order to strengthen their bargaining position.
Section 2 of the NLRA specifies that the term "employee" is not limited to
the employees of a particular employer.46 Regardless of whether the organizers'
aid is requested by employees of the particular plant or by employees elsewhere
who are members of the organizing union, once the organizer-employee relation-
ship is established, the courts' imposition of a "no-impediment" standard is
an unjustified barrier to effective self-organization.
Co., LAB. REL. REP. (36 L.R.P.M. 1340) (NLRB Aug. 11, 1955); Caterpillar Tractor
Co., LAB. RFi_ REP. (36 L.R.R.M. 1336) (NLRB Aug. 11, 1955).
42. NLRB v. Seamprufe, Inc., 222 F.2d 858, 861 (10th Cir. 1955) ; NLRB v. Babcock
and Wilcox Co., 222 F.2d 316, 319 (5th Cir. 1955); NLRB v. Monsanto Chemical Co.,
225 F.2d 16, 18, 21 (9th Cir. 1955).
43. NLRB v. Seamprufe, Inc., supra note 42, at 861.
44. NLRB v. Babcock and Wilcox Co., 222 F.2d 316, 317-18 (5th Cir. 1955).
45. While the cases lack details concerning an employee-organizer relationship, there
is no showing which negates the presumption of interest.
46. 49 STAT. 450 (1935), as amended, 29 U.S.C. § 152 (1952).
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